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INCIPIENCY 
Richard M. Steuer∗ 
 
“Incipiency” is the term describing the test by which 
mergers, acquisitions, and certain anticompetitive practices are 
prohibited under the Clayton Antitrust Act1 when the effect may 
be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. 
Properly applied, the incipiency test can satisfy demands that are 
coming from across the political spectrum to strengthen antitrust 
enforcement. If the Act needs to be clarified in order to assure 
proper application, there are means available to achieve greater 
clarity. 
Washington is resonating with calls to amend America’s 
antitrust laws to combat concentration, encourage innovation, and 
protect start-ups. These proposals include bills to introduce a 
“public interest” standard for certain transactions2 and shift the 
burden of proof for large mergers.3 
They also include a legislative proposal to revise the legal 
standard of the antitrust law applicable to mergers. Specifically, 
proposed legislation would change the standard in Section 7 of the 
Clayton Act from prohibiting mergers that may “substantially” 
lessen competition to prohibiting mergers that may “materially” 
lessen competition.4 
Sometimes overlooked in the debate is recognition that the 
Clayton Act is already designed to provide a potent antitrust tool 
that can accomplish most of the objectives of the new proposals. If 
                                                          
∗ Member of the New York Bar. 
       1    Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 14, 18 (1914). 
 2  See infra note 12 and accompanying text; cf. H.R. 2932, 115th Cong. § 3 
(2017) (proposing inclusion of a “net benefit” test in foreign investment reviews); 
H.R. 5665, 114th Cong. § 3 (2016) (same); H.R. 5581, 113th Cong. § 3 (2014) 
(same); see also Letter from Charles E. Grassley, United States Senator to Hon. 
Gene L. Dodaro, Comptroller Gen., U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off. (Sept. 15, 
2016) (on file with the U.S. gov’t Accountability Off.) (requesting report on 
adding net benefit test to CFIUS mandate). 
 3  S. 307, 116th Cong. § 2(b) (2019); see also S. 1812, 115th Cong. § 2(b) 
(2017). 
 4  S. 307, 116th Cong. § 3(1) (2019); see also S. 1812, 115th Cong. § 3(1) (2017). 
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Congress believes that the Act needs to be clarified to make it more 
effective, there is another way to amend the Act’s standard. 
Instead of changing the word defining the degree of harm to 
competition from “substantial” to “material”—words that are not 
likely to be interpreted very differently from one another by the 
courts—it would be more effective to clarify the temporal element 
of the standard, to specify that “may be” to lessen competition 
requires a less static analysis than some courts may be inclined to 
apply today. If Congress believes that the Clayton Act has not been 
sufficiently effective in curbing anticompetitive mergers, the 
solution is not simply to swap the word “materially” for 
“substantially,” but to confirm unmistakably that the Act reaches 
not only mergers that “lessen” competition to a significant degree 
but also mergers that threaten to lessen competition to a significant 
degree. 
THE CLAYTON ACT STANDARD 
For decades, two of the most knocked-around phrases in 
antitrust have been “may be substantially to lessen competition” 
and “tend to create a monopoly.” These tests—which reach 
anticompetitive harm in its incipiency—comprise the standard for 
judging mergers and acquisitions, as well as most exclusive dealing 
and tying, under the Clayton Act.5 
These are offenses that can harm the economy in two ways. 
Not only can they harm consumers by elevating prices, but they 
can foreclose competitors from competing effectively and foreclose 
new competitors from entering. 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act forbids acquisitions, the effect 
of which “may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to 
create a monopoly” in any relevant market.6 
Section 3 forbids conditioning the sale (or lease) of a 
commodity, or a price, discount, or rebate, on the buyer (or lessee) 
not using the goods of competitors where the effect “may be to 
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly” in 
any relevant market.7 
                                                          
 5  15 U.S.C. §§ 14, 18; see also 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1914) (utilizing the same 
language in Clayton Act provision on price discrimination, which was 
substantially amended by the Robinson-Patman Act in 1936 and then codified, 
but that provision has followed its own path of judicial application and 
interpretation). 
 6  15 U.S.C. § 18. 
 7  15 U.S.C. § 14. Note that in section 3, the infinitive is split – “to 
substantially lessen competition” – and one “to” is omitted. 
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The Clayton Act was enacted in 1914 to supplement the 
1890 Sherman Act, which prohibits anticompetitive contracts, 
combinations, or conspiracies. While the Sherman Act addresses 
anticompetitive practices that unreasonably restrain trade in the 
here and now, the Clayton Act was designed to halt 
anticompetitive acquisitions and foreclosure in their incipiency, 
before the harm they threaten is achieved. 
THE CURRENT DEBATE 
There has been increasingly heated debate over the need to 
strengthen America’s antitrust laws. Price fixing cartels have long 
been subject to a standard of per se illegality and criminal 
enforcement, but during the 2016 presidential election campaign, 
and continuing thereafter, a chorus of complaints arose about 
industrial concentration and perceived abuses by major 
businesses. Firms in the tech and airline industries became 
frequent targets of critics on both the left and the right.8 Proposals 
have been advanced by commentators, think tanks, and members 
of Congress for new measures to invigorate antitrust enforcement 
and do more to protect the public. 
Some of these proposals include broadening the standards 
by which competitive activity is judged. Certain critics want 
antitrust analysis to include more than the “consumer welfare” 
standard, which became the principal touchstone by which 
anticompetitive activity has been judged since the 1970s. Others 
simply want to make the antitrust laws more robust. 
When the first antitrust laws were adopted at the end of the 
Nineteenth Century, supporters of the new legislation were 
motivated by a desire not only to protect consumers, but to limit 
the power of big business and to preserve small businesses.9 Over 
the years, commentators defended the inclusion of “political” or 
“public interest” objectives in antitrust law, including Professor, 
and later Federal Trade Commission Chairman, Robert Pitofsky, 
                                                          
 8  Examples have grown too numerous to collect. To illustrate, both Fox 
News host Tucker Carlson and commentator William Kristol reportedly have 
called for investigations of Google and other tech leaders, as have Democrats in 
Congress, while travelers of all stripes have complained about the effects of 
concentration in the airline industry. On September 25, 2018, Attorney General 
Jeff Sessions met with Justice Department officials and fourteen state attorneys 
general to discuss competition concerns regarding tech companies. See Katie 
Benner and Cecilia Kang, Justice Dept. and State Officials Explore Ways to 
Keep Tech Giants in Check, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2018, at B2, col. 1. 
 9  See HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, 180-85 
(1955). 
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who wrote, in a widely-cited article, “[i]t is bad history, bad policy, 
and bad law to exclude certain political values in interpreting the 
antitrust laws.”10 
The “consumer welfare” standard, which eschews political 
values as too subjective, gained prominence in the 1970s. It was 
championed by Professor, and later Judge, Robert Bork in his 
influential 1978 book, The Antitrust Paradox. Professor Bork 
advocated that consumer welfare—low prices, high output, good 
quality, and maximum efficiency—is the only legitimate goal of 
antitrust, and that no other objectives should be recognized. 
In the ensuing years, courts interpreting the antitrust laws 
have increasingly come to adopt the consumer welfare standard as 
the sole standard for judging alleged antitrust violations. Likewise, 
enforcement agencies have come to rely on the consumer welfare 
standard as the only standard for assessing mergers and 
acquisitions, and deciding whether to challenge allegedly 
anticompetitive conduct in court. During the Obama 
administration, leaders of both the Federal Trade Commission and 
the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice defended 
adhering to the consumer welfare standard, asserting that antitrust 
agencies are “ill equipped” to consider other objectives and that 
enforcement decisions should be “based solely on the competitive 
effects and consumer benefits of the transaction or conduct being 
reviewed.”11 
More recently, however, critics began complaining that the 
consumer welfare standard has allowed too many mergers to 
create too much concentration in too many markets, allowing 
powerful companies to engage in practices that harm the economy. 
They contend that consumer welfare should be considered 
alongside other considerations, including market “openness,” the 
impact on employment and employees, concentration of political 
power, and innovation.12 
                                                          
 10  Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 
1051 (1979). 
 11  Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Core Competition 
Agency Principles: Lessons Learned at the FTC, Keynote Address at the 
Antitrust in Asia Conference 8 (May 22, 2014); Bill Baer, Assistant Att’y Gen., 
Antirust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, International Antitrust Enforcement: 
Progress Made; Work To Be Done 4 (Sept. 12, 2014). 
 12  See, e.g., CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, REVIVING ANTITRUST: 
WHY OUR ECONOMY NEEDS A PROGRESSIVE COMPETITION POLICY, 17 (2016); 
ROOSEVELT INST., UNTAMED: HOW TO CHECK CORPORATE, FINANCIAL, AND 
MONOPOLY POWER 23 (Nell Abernathy, Mike Konczal & Kathryn Milani eds., 
2016); Stacy Mitchell, The View From the Shop—Antitrust and the Decline of 
America’s Independent Businesses, 61 ANTITRUST BULL. 498, 511 (2016). 
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The debate has not been dispassionate. Proponents of 
broadening antitrust analysis have called the consumer welfare 
test “narrow” and “misguided.”13 Opponents have labeled 
proposals that range beyond the consumer welfare test as “hipster 
antitrust.”14 
The reality is that effective enforcement of the antitrust 
laws, even under the consumer welfare standard, should result in 
more jobs, less concentrated political power, and greater 
opportunity for small businesses. These are all legitimate 
objectives behind adopting and enforcing antitrust laws and all of 
these outcomes can be achieved, at least in part, through effective 
antitrust enforcement. But this does not mean that job creation, 
dispersion of political power, or preservation of small business 
need to become independent goals of antitrust enforcement 
regardless of whether there is harm to competition, or that they 
need to be added to the statutory antitrust standards. What it does 
mean is that in enforcing the antitrust laws, it is important to 
recognize that preventing the extinguishing of jobs and skills, 
preventing undue concentration of production and decision-
making, and preventing the foreclosure of new entrants and small 
business, are all manifestations of antitrust enforcement that is 
accomplishing its objectives. Concerns with jobs, political power, 
and small business should not become antitrust criteria in 
themselves in the absence of harm to a competitive economy, but 
if the antitrust laws are enforced effectively, all of these goals will 
be furthered together.15 
So, if Congress believes that the antitrust laws are not 
effective enough today, do the statutes themselves need to be 
revised? And, if so, are the revisions that are being proposed the 
best approach? 
There may be a better way. The Clayton Act’s incipiency 
test already applies to the activities—other than price fixing 
conspiracies—that trigger the greatest number of challenges—
specifically, mergers, acquisitions, exclusive dealing, and tying. 
Properly interpreted and applied, the incipiency test can and 
should be highly effective in combating these activities without the 
need to add new tests. If the incipiency test is not being applied 
                                                          
 13  ROOSEVELT INST., supra note 12, at 23; Brian Beutler, How Democrats 
Can Wage War on Monopolies—and Win, NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 16, 2017) 
(quoting Lina Khan), https://newrepublic.com/article/144675/democrats-
elizabeth-warren-can-wage-war-monopolies-and-win.  
 14  The term has been popularized by Professor Joshua Wright of the 
Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University.  
 15  Of course, these goals also can be furthered with more targeted programs. 
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effectively enough, the surest way to make it more potent is to 
reconfirm the prospective nature of the Clayton Act in terms that 
courts will recognize and will have to apply. 
THE CLAYTON ACT 
The Clayton Act was adopted in 1914 to fill gaps that had 
appeared in the coverage of the Sherman Act. Troubling mergers 
and acquisitions were escaping the reach of the Sherman Act, and 
exclusive dealing and tying persisted in closing off competition. 
The Clayton Act did not purport to change the goals of the 
antitrust laws. Instead, it amplified those laws by changing the 
time horizon for analysis in adopting what would become known 
as the “incipiency” doctrine. 
According to the House Report accompanying the Clayton 
bill, the purpose was “to arrest the creation of trusts, conspiracies, 
and monopolies in their incipiency and before consummation.”16 
The “may be substantially to lessen competition” or “tend to create 
a monopoly” tests were drafted to go beyond the more static 
standard that was being applied under the Sherman Act. 
This represented a compromise worked out between one 
block of legislators who wanted certain acquisitions and practices 
to become criminal violations, and another block of legislators who 
saw no need for the Clayton Act at all. In the second block’s view, 
the newly created Federal Trade Commission could adequately 
pursue and prohibit those acquisitions and practices. 
Originally, the Clayton bill’s provision on acquisitions 
made it a crime to acquire another company where the effect “is” 
to “eliminate or substantially lessen competition” or “create a 
monopoly.” The Senate rejected the criminal approach and 
unanimously changed this language to “where the effect may be to 
lessen competition.” The conference committee reconciled the 
House and Senate versions by combining “may be” from the Senate 
version and “substantially” from the House version. 
The original provision on exclusive dealing and tying 
similarly made those practices crimes. It also treated price 
discrimination as a crime. In removing the penal consequences for 
these practices, Congress incorporated the “substantially lessen 
competition or tend to create a monopoly” language from the 
section on acquisitions. 
We took the language that had been already approved by 
                                                          
 16  S. REP. NO. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914).  
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both the House and the Senate in another section [i.e., the 
section on acquisitions] . . . and applied it to . . . [the 
section on exclusive dealing and tying, and the section on 
price discrimination] so that the three sections . . . are in 
harmony now, all dealing with the question of contracts, 
the same principle being applied to each one of them.17 
As enacted, the Clayton Act applied the “may be” to 
“substantially” language and the “tend to” create a monopoly 
language both to acquisitions and to exclusive dealing and tying.18 
In the courts, the incipiency doctrine began to swing first in 
one direction and then the other over the years. Initially, lower 
courts interpreted Section 3 of the Clayton Act to embody the Rule 
of Reason test being applied under the Sherman Act and 
contemplated a wide-ranging examination of the facts and history, 
balancing any procompetitive and anticompetitive effects, with 
emphasis on the present and the immediate future.19 
This changed in Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-
Houston Co.,20 where the Supreme Court held that Section 3 had 
“tests of its own,” which were intended to reach agreements within 
its sphere “in their incipiency.”21 
This result was not reached without a fight. Charles Evans 
Hughes, representing the manufacturer in Standard Fashion, had 
argued that Section 3 of the Clayton Act only applied to a 
challenged contract if that contract were “seriously to threaten or 
                                                          
 17  Hon. H.C. Floyd, Adoption of Conference Report on the Clayton 
Antitrust Bill 5 (Oct. 8, 1914) in ANTITRUST LEGISLATION: SPEECHES IN THE 
U.S. SENATE AND HOUSE OF REP’S 63D CONGRESS 118 (2014). The assumption 
here was that unlike price fixing conspiracies, acquisitions, exclusive dealing, 
tying, and price discrimination offenses all involve contracts of some variety. 
 18  It also applied to price discrimination. See 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1914) . 
 19  See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of New York v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 273 F. 
478, 482 (2d Cir. 1921) (explaining no violation “at present” where effect “is not” 
to substantially lessen competition); Pictorial Review Co. v. Curtis Publishing 
Co., 255 Fed. 206, 210 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (illustrating failure to establish that 
contract “causes an unreasonable restraint of trade”); Breck P. McAllister, 
Where the Effect May Be to Substantially Lessen Competition or Tend to 
Create a Monopoly, 3 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW 124, 136-37 (1953); 
see also Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 57-58 
(1911); Bd. of Trade of City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). 
But see Standard Elec. Mfg. Co., 5 F.T.C. 376 (1923) (the Federal Trade 
Commission applied a rule of virtually per se illegality to exclusive dealing under 
Section 3 of the Clayton Act in a number of cases); B.S. Pearsall Butter Co., 5 
F.T.C. 127 (1922); Stanley Booking Corp., 1 F.T.C. 212 (1918).  
 20  258 U.S. 346 (1922). 
 21  Id. at 356. 
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actually to accomplish a substantial lessening of competition or an 
actual tendency toward monopoly,” and did not outlaw the 
manufacturer’s exclusive dealing contracts with retailers.22 
The Court disagreed. It held that the “may” be to 
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly 
standard deals with the “consequences to follow” a restrictive 
agreement.23 At the same time, addressing substantiality, the Court 
opined that Section 3 did not prohibit the “mere possibility” of 
anticompetitive consequences. Rather, according to the Court, it 
was intended to prevent agreements shown to “probably lessen 
competition, or create an actual tendency to monopoly,” though 
not reaching every “remote lessening” of competition, as 
demonstrated by the requirement that the lessening of competition 
must be “substantial.”24 
Notably, the Court found that there was no need to consult 
the legislative history. It remarked that although the parties had 
made much of the 1914 committee reports, “the words of the act 
are plain and their meaning is apparent without the necessity of 
resorting to the extraneous statements and often unsatisfactory aid 
of such reports.”25 
“May” and “tend” are modal verbs, indicating the likelihood 
of something happening in the future or over a period of time. 
Perhaps because of this, and because of the contrast with the 
language of the earlier Sherman Act (whereby contracts “in 
restraint of trade” are declared illegal), the Court had no hesitation 
in applying the plain meaning rule. 
In Standard Fashion, the lower court found that the 
petitioner controlled some 40 percent of the available outlets. 
Subsequently, the pendulum swung toward applying the 
incipiency doctrine in situations where the degree of foreclosure 
was less. In the 1949 Standard Stations case,26 the degree of 
foreclosure was 16 percent of the available outlets, although the 
major suppliers in the industry collectively foreclosed 58 percent. 
In the 1962 Brown Shoe case,27 which was a merger case, the 
degree of foreclosure varied from city to city, from as much as 57 
percent to as little as five percent. 
                                                          
 22  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 19, at 11-32; see McAllister, supra note 
19, at 133-34. 
 23  Standard Fashion Co., 258 U.S. at 356. 
 24  Id. at 356-57. 
 25  Id. at 356. 
 26  Standard Oil Co. v. United States (Standard Stations), 337 U.S. 293 
(1949). 
 27  Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).  
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In the 1961 Tampa Electric case,28 addressing another 
exclusive dealing arrangement, the Court explained that 
“substantiality” in a given case depends upon the “probable effect” 
on competition, including “the probable immediate and future 
effects which pre-emption of that share of the market might have 
on effective competition therein.”29 This became known as the rule 
of “qualitative substantiality” because it allowed for consideration 
of more than just percentages. At the same time, the Court made 
clear that the Clayton Act has a broader reach than the Sherman 
Act, holding that if an exclusive arrangement “does not fall within 
the broader proscription of § 3 of the Clayton Act,” it is not 
forbidden by the Sherman Act.30 
Nevertheless, in subsequent years the incipiency test began 
to become indistinguishable from the Sherman Act rule of reason 
test again. Lower courts went so far as to opine that there no longer 
was any meaningful difference between the degree of foreclosure 
required to prove a violation under the Sherman Act test or the 
Clayton Act test. For example, in one case the court of appeals 
held, “[i]n substance, the Tampa Electric standard for Clayton Act 
Section 3 claims differs very marginally, if at all, from the fact-
intensive rule-of-reason analysis that applies to this case under 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.”31 
In effect, this represents a return to the interpretation that 
appeared in judicial opinions prior to the Standard Fashion 
decision in 1922. While this approach purports to derive from 
Tampa Electric, it is not altogether consistent with that decision, 
where the Supreme Court compared the Sherman Act to the 
Clayton Act and confirmed the “broader prescription of § 3 of the 
Clayton Act.”32 
Meanwhile, Section 7 of the Clayton Act, the section 
applying to acquisitions, also evolved. A loophole in the 1914 act 
left the new law applicable to acquisitions of stock but not of 
assets, and deals routinely were structured to avoid the law. 
                                                          
 28  Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961). 
 29  Id. at 329. 
 30  Id. at 335. 
 31  ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 327 n.26 (3d Cir. 2012); 
cf. In re EpiPen (Epinephrine Injection, USP) Mktg., Sales Practices & Antitrust 
Litig., No. 17-MD-2785-DDC-TJJ, 2017 WL 6524839, at n.4 (D. Kan. Dec. 21, 
2017)(“Although Tampa Electric involved a Clayton Act claim, courts also 
apply its analysis to exclusive dealing claims asserted under the Sherman Act.”); 
see also K-Flex, Inc. v. Armacell, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 3d 730, 736 (E.D.N.C. 2017) 
(“Plaintiff has stated a Clayton Act claim for substantially the same reasons as 
it has stated Sherman Act claims.”). 
 32  Tampa Elec. Co., 365 U.S. at 335. 
164 Loyola Consumer Law Review Vol. 31:2 
Litigation tended to focus not on how to apply Section 7, but 
whether Section 7 applied at all. In 1950, Congress closed the 
loophole by passing the Cellar-Kefauver Act,33 which amended 
Section 7 to make it applicable to acquisitions of assets as well as 
stock. 
Congress took the occasion to reiterate that the Clayton Act 
reaches threats to competition in their incipiency. The Senate 
Committee report explained that the purpose of the bill “was to 
make this legislation extend to acquisitions which are not 
forbidden by the Sherman Act, . . . framing a bill which . . . reaches 
far beyond the Sherman Act.”34 At the same time, the report made 
clear that Congress understood the word “may” to mean 
reasonable “probability” rather than “possibility.” The bill “would 
not apply to the mere possibility but only to the reasonable 
probability of the prescribed effect, as determined by the [Federal 
Trade] Commission in accord with the Administrative Procedure 
Act.”35 
The 1950 House Report noted that acquisitions by which a 
“restraint of trade is created are forbidden by the Sherman Act” 
already. “The present bill is not intended as a mere reenactment of 
this prohibition.”36 Instead, it explained that acquisitions “have a 
cumulative effect” and the 1950 bill was 
intended to permit intervention in such a cumulative 
process when the effect of an acquisition may be a 
significant reduction in the vigor of competition, even 
though this effect may not be so far-reaching as to 
amount to a combination in restraint of trade, create a 
monopoly, or constitute an attempt to monopolize.37 
Subsequently, the Supreme Court applied the incipiency 
doctrine in the few merger cases that it decided. In a series of cases 
decided in the 1960s, the court applied the incipiency doctrine to 
block acquisitions involving combined market shares as low as 
seven percent where there was evidence of a trend towards 
increasing concentration in the market. Brown Shoe, Philadelphia 
National Bank, “Alcoa/Rome,” Pabst Brewing, and Von’s Grocery 
all concerned acquisitions that involved some degree of 
                                                          
 33  Act of December 29, 1950, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1120, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 
(H.R. 2734, Public 899). 
 34  S. REP. NO. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1950).  
 35  Id. at 5.  
 36  H.R. REP. NO. 1191, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1950).  
 37  Id. 
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incipiency.38 
In Brown Shoe, the Court observed that in drafting the 
Clayton Act, Congress was concerned “with probabilities, not 
certainties” and that “[m]ergers with a probable anticompetitive 
effect were to be proscribed” by the Act.39 In Philadelphia National 
Bank, the Court stated that the incipiency test “requires not merely 
an appraisal of the immediate impact of the merger upon 
competition, but a prediction of its impact upon competitive 
conditions in the future; this is what is meant when it is said that 
the amended § 7 was intended to arrest anticompetitive tendencies 
in their ‘incipiency.’”40 The Court added that the incipiency 
doctrine “lightens the burden of proving illegality” but cautioned 
that this applies “only with respect to mergers whose size makes 
them inherently suspect in light of Congress’ design in § 7 to 
prevent undue concentration.”41 
The Court also rejected the possibility of weighing “social 
or economic debits and credits” in reviewing an acquisition that 
substantially lessens competition, on the ground that “[a] value 
choice of such magnitude is beyond the ordinary limits of judicial 
competence.”42 
Brown Shoe, Philadelphia National Bank, and Von’s 
Grocery, have been heavily criticized for blocking acquisitions that 
involved small market shares in certain markets. In certain other 
markets, however, the market shares in these same cases would 
have reached over 50 percent. All of these cases were decided years 
before enactment of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act,43 which requires 
that large mergers and acquisitions be reported to the Federal 
Trade Commission and Department of Justice prior to closing, 
enabling those agencies to review the pertinent facts and decide 
whether or not to challenge a deal in court. As a practical matter, 
the result has been that in most instances today, concerns about 
anticompetitive consequences of acquisitions are addressed 
through negotiations and settlements between the parties and the 
enforcers prior to closing. If there are serious issues concerning 
                                                          
 38  Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 294; United States v. Philadelphia Nat. 
Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa 
Rome), 377 U.S. 271 (1964); United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 
(1966); United States v. Von’s Grocery, 384 U.S. 270 (1966). 
 39  370 U.S. at 323. 
 40  374 U.S. at 362. 
 41  Id. at 363. 
 42  Id. at 371. 
 43  Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
435, § 201, 90 Stat. 1390 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18a). 
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certain discrete relevant markets, those often are resolved through 
partial divestitures that allow the rest of the deal to proceed. 
Accordingly, it is fair to ask whether a case like Von’s Grocery 
would be resolved the same way today.44 
The Supreme Court’s next, and most recent, antitrust 
decision on mergers and acquisitions came in the 1974 General 
Dynamics case,45 where the Court held that if, because of capacity 
constraints, current market shares are not meaningful indicators of 
competitive dynamics in the future, a realistic assessment of future 
conditions should control, not a static assessment of current 
conditions. This is the other side of the incipiency test, recognizing 
that where there is a tendency toward less concentration, there is a 
reduced threat to competition. 
The Supreme Court has not decided any substantive 
merger cases since, and it never undertook to judicially repeal the 
incipiency doctrine from Section 7 of the Clayton Act. 
Meanwhile, the Department of Justice and Federal Trade 
Commission began issuing merger guidelines in 1968. These 
guidelines assumed growing importance, particularly after the 
adoption of premerger notification under the Hart-Scott-Rodino 
Act. Although the guidelines were published to explain the 
agencies’ methodology in making enforcement decisions, lower 
courts increasingly have applied the guidelines to decide merger 
cases in the absence of more recent guidance from the Supreme 
Court.46 
The guidelines do not explicitly address the incipiency 
doctrine. Instead, they provide that “the Agencies normally 
evaluate mergers based on their impact on customers”47 and 
recognize that even “[w]hen evaluating a consummated merger, 
the ultimate issue is not only whether adverse competitive effects 
have already resulted from the merger, but also whether such 
effects are likely to arise in the future.”48 
Since the introduction of premerger notification, most 
                                                          
 44  See Koninklijke Ahold N.V., 81 Fed. Reg. 51888 (Aug. 5, 2016) (aid to 
public comment), decision and order in 2016 FTC LEXIS 189; Dollar Tree, Inc. 
& Family Dollar Stores, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,810 (July 20, 2015) (aid to public 
comment), decision and order in 2015 FTC LEXIS 216. 
 45  United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 414 U.S. 486 (1974). 
 46  See Hillary Greene, Guideline Institutionalization: The Role of Merger 
Guidelines in Antitrust Discourse, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771 (2006). 
 47  Guidelines for Horizontal Mergers, U.S. Dep’t of Justice and Federal 
Trade Comm’n 1, 2 (Aug. 19, 2010), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-
review/100819hmg.pdf. 
 48  Id. at 3.  
2019 Incipiency 167 
merger cases have been settled and most of the rest have been 
decided on motions for preliminary or permanent injunctions. The 
lower courts have not been entirely uniform in their approach to 
mergers but generally have acknowledged, to a greater or lesser 
degree, that the “may be substantially to lessen” language must be 
taken into account. For example, in the 2014 decision in United 
States v. Bazaarvoice, Inc.,49 where the court blocked a merger, the 
judge observed that “to establish a violation of Section 7, the 
government need not prove that the merger has resulted in higher 
prices or had other anticompetitive effects. Rather, the government 
must show a ‘reasonable likelihood’ of anticompetitive effect in the 
relevant market.”50 In the 2004 decision in United States v. Oracle 
Corp.,51 where the court declined to block a merger, the judge 
observed that “Section 7 does not require proof that a merger or 
other acquisition [will] cause higher prices in the affected market. 
All that is necessary is that the merger create an appreciable 
danger of such consequences in the future.”52 
In the 2018 decision in United States v. AT&T Inc.,53 where 
the district court declined to block AT&T’s acquisition of Time 
Warner Inc., the trial judge characterized the Justice Department’s 
definition of incipiency as a “moving target,” vacillating between a 
requirement to show that the transaction is “likely” to harm 
competition and a requirement to show a “reasonable probability” 
or “appreciable danger” of harm to competition.54 The judge saw 
                                                          
 49  United States v. Bazaarvoice, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3284 (N.D. 
Cal. 2014). 
 50  Id. at *5 (citing United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 170 
(1964) (noting that a Section 7 violation is shown when “the ‘reasonable 
likelihood’ of a substantial lessening of competition in the relevant market is 
shown”) (citation omitted)). 
 51  331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1109-10 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
 52  Id. at 1109; see also FTC v. Whole Foods Market, Inc., 533 F.3d 869, 882 
(D.C. Cir. 2008)(Tatel, J. concurring, citing Brown Shoe language on 
“probabilities”); FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 713 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
(citing Brown Shoe language on “probabilities”); United States v. Baker Hughes 
Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“By focusing on the future, section 7 
gives a court the uncertain task of assessing probabilities.”); FTC v. Sysco Corp., 
113 F. Supp.3d 1, 52 (D.D.C. 2015) (assessing “likely effects”); United States v. 
H&R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp.2d 36, 49 (D.D.C. 2011) (“All that is necessary is 
that the merger create an appreciable danger” of higher prices in the affected 
market “in the future,” citing Hosp. Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1389 
(7th Cir. 1986)); United States v. SunGard Data Systems, Inc., 172 F. Supp.2d 
172, 180 (D.D.C. 2001). 
 53  United States v. AT&T Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d, 
916 F.3d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
 54  Id. at 189, n.16. 
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no real difference, citing the Supreme Court and concluding, “[i]n 
the final analysis, each alternative formulation appears aimed at 
clarifying the central point that Section 7 does not require ‘certain’ 
harm, but instead permits courts to use predictive judgment to 
‘arrest anticompetitive tendencies in their “incipiency.”’”55 The 
judge held that “Section 7 ‘demand[s] that a plaintiff demonstrate 
that the substantial lessening of competition will be “sufficiently 
probable and imminent” to warrant relief.’”56 He concluded that 
“‘antitrust theory and speculation cannot trump facts’; the 
Government must make its case ‘on the basis of the record 
evidence relating to the market and its probable future.’”57 The 
judge determined that even if the correct standard is “reasonable 
probability” of harm or “appreciable danger” of harm—requiring 
“more than a ‘mere possibility’ but less than a ‘more likely than 
not’ showing of harm”58—the government had not met its burden. 
Yet rather than ending the analysis there, he went on to cite four 
“but see” cases suggesting that the more correct standard is “likely” 
to lessen competition substantially.59 
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed, noting 
that the district court had “acknowledged the uncertainty 
regarding the measure of proof for the government’s burden,” and 
that the government “had used various phrases” to describe that 
burden, including the need to show “an ‘appreciable danger’ of 
competitive harm” or that “harm is ‘likely’ or ‘reasonably 
probable.’”60 The court pointed out that the district court found no 
need to “articulate the differences” among these formulations and 
that there was “no need to opine on the proper legal standards” on 
appeal either, because “neither party challenge[d] the legal 
standards the district court applied.”61 The court did offer the 
observation that Congress had “left to the courts the difficult task 
of assessing probabilities” and that “[a]lthough Section 7 requires 
more than a ‘mere possibility’ of competitive harm, it does not 
                                                          
 55  Id. (citing Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. at 171 (quoting Philadelphia 
Nat. Bank, 374 U.S. at 362 (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 56  Id. at 190 (citing FTC v. Arch Coal, 329 F. Supp.2d 109, 115 (D.D.C. 
2004) (quoting United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 623 n.22 
(1974)). 
 57  Id. at 221.  
 58  Id. at 189, n.16 
 59  Id. (citing United States v. Baker Hughes, 908 F.2d 981, 991 (D.C. Cir. 
1990); United States v. Anthem, Inc., 236 F. Supp.3d 171, 215 (D.D.C. 2017); 
United States v. Aetna, Inc., 240 F. Supp.3d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2017); FTC v. Staples, 
Inc., 190 F.Supp.3d 100, 110 (D.D.C. 2016)).  
 60  United States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
 61  Id.  
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require proof of certain harm.” And then, quoting from the parties’ 
joint statement on the burden of proof at trial, the court added that 
in order to establish a prima facie case, “the government must 
make a ‘fact-specific’ showing that the proposed merger is ‘likely 
to be anticompetitive.’”62 
Where does that leave the incipiency doctrine today? The 
Clayton Act still applies to acquisitions, exclusive dealing, and 
tying that “may” substantially lessen competition or “tend to” 
create a monopoly. The incipiency doctrine has never been 
repealed by Congress or jettisoned by the Supreme Court. But the 
doctrine plainly assumed less prominence in exclusive dealing and 
tying cases over the years, and it has been applied with less 
certainty in merger cases, with requirements that the harm to 
competition must be “likely” and “imminent” appearing in more 
and more cases. 
So, what should the future be for the incipiency doctrine? 
Does it need a boost? 
APPLYING THE INCIPIENCY DOCTRINE TODAY 
If Congress concludes that antitrust enforcement has not 
been effective enough, the simplest solution can be found in 
assuring more resolute application of the incipiency doctrine, 
which Congress created for this purpose over a hundred years ago. 
The incipiency doctrine does not alter the degree to which a merger 
or practice ultimately must be harmful to competition in order to 
be unacceptable; rather the doctrine extends the time horizon for 
assessing anticompetitive harm. 
In so doing, the incipiency doctrine serves to interdict 
harmful mergers and practices earlier, preventing significant harm 
to competition before that harm reaches its full potential. This 
should have a beneficial effect on jobs (since a greater number of 
competing employers will operate), concentration of power (since 
a greater number of business owners will exist), and small business 
(because less foreclosure will be permitted), as well as on prices, 
output, quality, and efficiency. This also should obviate the need 
to enact more controversial legislative solutions, such as injecting 
a “public interest” standard into antitrust law. 
If Congress believes that the courts have grown too 
reluctant to apply the incipiency doctrine, Congress has the power 
to reinvigorate the doctrine by Congressional resolution or 
                                                          
 62  Id. at 1032.  
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clarifying legislation.63 The Celler-Kefauver Act itself served to 
reconfirm the view of Congress on the incipiency doctrine, 
resulting in renewed enforcement, and this can be done again. 
Whatever approach might be taken, however, it will not bring 
about change unless it impacts outcomes in court. As described 
above, courts can and do put their own interpretations on 
legislation and a single piece of legislation can be interpreted in any 
number of ways unless its requirements are unmistakable. 
How can this be accomplished? As noted at the outset, one 
proposal—part of a bill introduced in 2017 and reintroduced in 
2019 by Senator Klobuchar, titled the “Consolidation Prevention 
and Competition Promotion Act”—is to amend Section 7 to change 
from a requirement of proving that the effect of an acquisition may 
be “substantially” to lessen competition, to a requirement of 
proving that the effect may be “materially” to lessen competition.64 
The stated purpose of this change would be to “clarify” that the 
Clayton Act prohibits consolidations that may materially lower 
quality, reduce choice, reduce innovation, exclude competitors, 
heighten entry barriers, or increase price.65 The bill specifies that 
“inserting the phrase ‘materially’” is intended “to establish that the 
plaintiff need not show an acquisition may cause a substantial 
amount of harm to competition, but rather show that an 
acquisition may cause more than a de minimis amount of harm to 
competition.” 
The question this raises is whether the terms “substantially” 
and “materially” are distinct enough to make a difference in the 
application of Section 7 in court. 
Apparently, the assumption behind the bill is that the term 
                                                          
 63  Cf. H.R. Res. 303, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (House resolution 
articulating congressional intent; “Resolved, That is the sense of the House of 
Representatives” that the Justice Department’s 1985 vertical restraints 
guidelines “are not an accurate expression of the Federal antitrust laws or of 
congressional intent” and “shall not be accorded any force of law or be treated 
by the courts of the United States as binding or persuasive”); S. Con. Res. 56, 
99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (same); Pub. L. No. 99-180, § 605, 99 Stat. 1170 (1985) 
(providing that no appropriated funds may be used to advocate altering the per 
se rule against resale price maintenance and incorporating the resolution on the 
vertical restraints guidelines); H.R. REP. 99-399 (1st Sess. 1985) (accompanying 
H. R. Res. 303); Pub. L. No. 98-166 § 510, 97 Stat. 1102 (1983) (cutting off 
funding for the Department of Justice to advocate for changing the per se rule 
against minimum resale price maintenance). 
 64  S. 307, 116th Cong., 1st Sess. (2019); S. 1812, 115th Cong., 1st Sess., § 3(1) 
(2017). 
 65  The bill would not amend Section 3 of the Clayton Act, on exclusive 
dealing and tying. 
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“substantially” lessen competition has come to mean something 
more than a “material” lessening of competition. As described 
earlier, it is true that, originally, the Clayton bill’s provision on 
acquisitions made it a crime to acquire another company where the 
effect “is” to “eliminate or substantially lessen competition” or 
“create a monopoly.” This might suggest that originally, inclusion 
of the word “substantially” was meant to raise the bar for illegality 
(and criminality). Congress removed the criminal penalties and 
added “may be” and “tend to,” but without removing 
“substantially.” 
Assuming that “materially” means “more than a de minimis 
amount,” as specified in the bill itself, the bill would prohibit 
acquisitions, the effect of which may be to lessen competition by 
more than a de minimis amount, or tend to create a monopoly. 
But would this alter the outcome of merger challenges? 
Would it require courts to block acquisitions involving market 
shares smaller than those involved in Brown Shoe and Von’s 
Grocery, which were decided under the current “substantially” 
lessen competition standard? Would it require rewriting the 
merger guidelines which, although technically limited to an 
expression of the enforcement intentions of the two federal 
antitrust agencies, have become the de facto code followed by some 
federal courts? Of course, changing the word “substantially” to 
“materially” would not weaken the applicability of the Clayton 
Act, but it is not clear that when courts would apply the law to the 
facts, the two words would be interpreted very differently. How 
much daylight would courts find to exist between “substantially” 
and “more than a de minimis amount?”66 
The more important concept behind the incipiency doctrine 
is its time horizon, which requires courts to assess the impact on 
competition further into the future than the Sherman Act requires, 
and to assess tendencies toward creation of monopoly rather than 
fully ripened attempts to monopolize or the completed acquisition 
and exercise of monopoly power. More important than whether 
“substantially” means something more than “materially” is 
whether “may be” and “tend to” are being applied by the courts as 
Congress intended. The Supreme Court has made the point that, 
in adopting the Celler-Kefauver Act amendments to Section 7, 
Congress was concerned “with probabilities, not certainties” and 
that “[m]ergers with a probable anticompetitive effect were to be 
                                                          
 66  Cf. AT&T Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d at 189, n.16 (“I need not further toil over 
discerning or articulating the daylight, if any, between ‘appreciable danger,’ 
‘probable,’ ‘reasonably probable,’ and ‘likely’ as used in the Section 7 context”). 
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proscribed” by the Act.67 Changing “may be substantially to lessen” 
to “may be materially to lessen” might address the degree of harm 
required but would not change the degree of “probability” 
required. As pointed out in the Senate Report that accompanied 
the 1950 amendments, Section 7 is supposed to apply to “the the 
reasonable probability of the prescribed effect.”68 
If Congress wants to assure that courts apply the Clayton 
Act effectively, a more meaningful amendment to the Act would 
be to change the word “lessen” to “threaten,” so that Section 7 
would forbid acquisitions, the effect of which “is substantially 
[or “materially” if that term is preferred] to threaten 
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly” in any relevant 
market. The phrase “substantially to threaten” (or “materially to 
threaten”) would reinforce the prospective nature of the harm that 
would need to be demonstrated rather than only modifying the 
degree of competitive harm that would need to be demonstrated.69 
It also should eliminate the interpretation some courts give to the 
phrase “may be substantially to lessen competition” to mean that 
the substantial lessening of competition must be “likely” and 
“imminent.”70 
It is noteworthy that the Clayton Act already incorporates 
the concept of a threat, providing that private parties may sue for 
injunctive relief against “threatened” loss or damage.71 In contrast, 
parties seeking monetary recovery may sue for damages 
“sustained.”72 From the beginning, then, the Clayton Act included 
the word “threatened” to convey the concept of prospective harm. 
                                                          
 67  Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 323. 
 68  S. REP. NO. 1775, at 5 (2d Sess. 1950). 
 69  Substitution of the word “threaten” also can eliminate the need for the 
word “may.” Prohibiting acquisitions the effect of which “may” be to “threaten” 
competitive harm might be interpreted to encompass so much as to prohibit 
virtually every acquisition. 
 70  Note that the phrase “sufficiently probable and imminent” derives from 
United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 623 n.22 (1974) (quoting 
United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 458 (1964), where it referred 
to the fact that “the competition with which § 7 deals includes not only existing 
competition but that which is sufficiently probable and imminent.” However, 
this phrase more recently has been cited for the proposition that “a plaintiff must 
demonstrate that the substantial lessening of competition will be ‘sufficiently 
probable and imminent’ to warrant relief.” Arch Coal, 329 F. Supp.2d at 115, 
cited in AT&T, Inc., 310 F. Supp.3d at 189. In other words, this phrase is being 
reinterpreted to mean not that the competition to be protected may be either 
existing or imminent, but that the harm to competition must be imminent).  
 71  Section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26. 
 72  Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15; see also 15 U.S.C. § 15a (the 
United States also may sue for damages “sustained”). 
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Consistent with that connotation, substituting the word “threaten” 
in Section 7 would not alter, but could clarify in no uncertain 
terms, the intended character of the phrase “may be substantially 
to lessen competition.” 
This change should suffice to halt the creep toward 
narrower interpretations of the incipiency doctrine. But if there is 
concern that changing “lessen” to “threaten” would not be enough 
to move the needle in the courts, there is an additional revision that 
could be considered. It is clear that the incipiency doctrine reaches 
probabilities—what the trial judge in AT&T called “more likely 
than not”—and does not reach mere possibilities, but it cannot 
fairly be said to require the “likelihood” of harm to competition 
because between likelihoods and mere possibilities, there is the 
reasonably foreseeable prospect of harm to competition that is less 
than “likely” but more than merely “possible.” In other words, there 
is harm that is “as likely as not,” rather than “more likely than not.” 
If Congress wants to strengthen the interpretation of incipiency, it 
could amend Section 7 to reflect this distinction by not only 
inserting the word “threaten” but by explicitly including the 
element of foreseeability. The Section would then provide that 
Section 7 forbids acquisitions where “the reasonably foreseeable 
effect of such acquisition is substantially [or ‘materially’ if that 
term is preferred] to threaten competition, or to tend to create 
a monopoly” in any relevant market. This would make clear that 
the threat to competition must be more than a mere possibility and 
must be reasonably foreseeable, but without requiring a plaintiff 
to demonstrate that competitive harm is more likely than not. If 
the threat of substantial (or material) harm to competition is 
reasonably foreseeable, even if not imminent, making it as likely as 
not to occur, the incipiency test should be satisfied without the 
need to show that the harm is more likely than not to occur, and is 
likely to occur imminently. 
Foreseeability is a concept that is familiar in the law, 73 
distinguishing the foreseeable from the speculative. An occurrence 
need not be more likely than not to occur in order to be foreseeable. 
Rather, it needs to be reasonably probable, which is exactly what 
the incipiency doctrine requires. 
These clarifications would reflect the test that Congress 
                                                          
 73  See, e.g., the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, 15 
U.S.C. § 6a(1) (applying to conduct having a “direct, substantial, and reasonably 
foreseeable” effect on specified trade or commerce); H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 8 
(contrasting effects that are “highly unlikely” with consequences that are 
“reasonably foreseeable”); Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 856 
(7th Cir. 2012). 
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crafted in 1914 and reconfirmed in 1950. If this is not the test 
currently being applied under Section 7 in every court, these 
clarifications should help to return the law to what Congress 
intended. 
CONCLUSION 
Over the years, there have been repeated efforts to water 
down the “may be substantially to lessen competition” and “tend 
to create a monopoly” tests, but whether those tests are rebooted 
again or not, they will continue in effect and go to the heart of the 
present controversy over the effectiveness of antitrust 
enforcement. Whether or not the Clayton Act is amended once 
more, the Act already is meant to outlaw acquisitions and practices 
that “may substantially lessen” competition in the future or “tend 
to” diminish competition by threatening monopoly power. 
To borrow the words of the Supreme Court, this is the 
essence of what is “meant when it is said that the amended § 7 was 
intended to arrest anticompetitive tendencies in their 
‘incipiency.’”74 
So, whether there is new legislation or not, the incipiency 
doctrine provides a powerful tool that is capturing attention once 
again. The latest revival of incipiency, it seems, has just begun. 
 
                                                          
 74  Phila. Nat. Bank, 374 U.S. at 363. 
